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THE FATAL RACE:
LAW-MAKING AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
DEVELOPMENT GOALS*
Robert B. Seidman**
No Third World political leadership will attempt radical
institutional change to implement development goals - that is, to
alleviate poverty and powerlessness of the masses - unless their
leadership interests and ideologies conflict with those of the
economic ruling class. For purposes of this paper, I assume that
in many countries, the day after gaining Independence, that precise
contradiction existed.' In these nations, a political leadership,
which had acquired power with a populist, frequently socialist
rhetoric, controlled a country whose laws and economic institutions
had emerged out of colonial capitalism, which had caused mass
poverty and powerlessness. A fatal race ensued: Would the
leaders transform the institutions to favor the poor and
disinherited? or would the institutions transform the leadership?
Why, so often, did the institutions win? How can a willing
leadership employ newly-won state power to make it more likely
that the poor will not so frequently lose out in this fatal race?
Those questions have no general answers, applicable to every
time and place. Experience elsewhere, however, becomes useful
as the basis for theory. A proposed legal solution for a specific
developmental problem in a particular time and place, requires
I am indebted to Ann Seidman for useful critique.
Professor of Law and Political Science, Boston University.
1. I assume that most of the first generation of leaders of the newly independent former
colonies, men and women who had fought through the independence struggles, sometimes for
many years in conditions of penury and hardship, not to say genuine physical danger, did not
do so merely to enrich themselves; if they did, they did not act as rational maximizing
economic people, for there are easier ways to make a living than fighting as a guerilla or living
as a refugee leader of a poor freedom movement. But see F. FANON, WRETCHED OF THE
EARTH (1965).
2. See R.B. SEIDMAN, STATE, LAW AND DEVELOPMENT (1978), Chapt. II. (Except
serendipitously, law copied from one country or time will not induce the same behavior in its
new home that it did in the old - the "Law of Non-Transferability of Law.")
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time-and-place specific analysis and empirical research. Research,
however, requires bounds on enquiry - that is, general
propositions to tell the researcher where she might find useful
information (heuristics, or theory). Based mainly on the
Anglophonic African experience this paper undertakes to develop
such a theory.
It addresses only the contribution of the law-making system to
implementing development goals. Section I describes the way that
the legal order became part of the problem of underdevelopment,
rather than part of its solution. Section II explains generally how
deficiencies in the law-making system defeated effective
implementation of developmental goals. Section III explains why
individual lawmakers did so little to advance development, and
Section IV, how the law-making system as a system contributed to
that failure. Section V asks why the lawmakers did not change the
system itself, and for an explanation, looks to the development of
a bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Finally, drawing on this analysis,
Section VI suggests a general strategy that might win the race for
the poor.
I. The Difficulty: The Legal Order as the Cause of
Third World Poverty and Powerlessness
Despite earlier rhetoric advocating the use of state power to
alleviate mass poverty and powerlessness,4 the 1990s found most
Third World peoples poorer and more vulnerable than at
Independence, their economies in tatters, their political structures
3. Thus, by theory I do not mean either a set of general propositions relating variables,
good in every time and place, nor a set of prescriptions also purporting to hold for every time
and place (e.g., neo-classical economics as practiced by some economists).
4. President Nkrumah summed up that rhetoric in the slogan for his Convention People's
Party: "Seek ye first the political kingdom."
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fragile and non-democratic.5 That counts as a failure of the legal
order.
Like all social problems, poverty and powerlessness result from
patterns of behavior, that is, institutions.6 Everywhere, the legal
order bears a systematic relationship to the institutions that create
and maintain patterns of behavior, and which in turn determine
productivity and who has wealth and power.7 Of all the manifold
causes of Third World poverty and powerlessness, the organized
polity can most readily manipulate the law. Third World
governments, however, did not do so in ways that reduced poverty
and powerlessness, but rather in ways that maintained and
increased poverty and powerlessness. Law became not part of the
solution, but part of the problem.
II. Law-Making and Implementing Developmental Goals
Laws have failed to achieve developmental goals for any of
three reasons: because they continue in force the received law; are
new laws prescribing inappropriate behaviors; or are new laws
prescribing appropriate behaviors but which fail to induce those
behaviors.
5. What few successes existed turned out to rest as much on accidents of time and place
as on wise management. For example, the discovery of oil reserves, massive United States
military expenditures in the wake of the Korean and Vietnam Wars (Hong Kong and South
Korea), combined with the lucky timing of an export drive coupled with the rapid expansion
of world trade that bloomed in the 1960s and 1970s, and faded in the 1980s (Southeast Asia's
four "little dragons" - South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan).
6. Cf. G. HOMANS, SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ITS ELEMENTARY FORMS (1961).
7. Its actual influence on behavior depends upon the circumstances. For example, about
20% of automobile drivers use their seat belts, even though the law requires it; where the law
require motorcyclists to wear helmets, almost all of them do so. But see J. Griffiths, "Is the
Law Important?," 59 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 339 (1979); R.L KIDDER, CONNECrINo LAW AND
SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH AND THEORY (1983) Ch. 6 passim.
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A. The Colonial Legacy
In terms of resource allocation, the colonial economic system
pumped surpluses earned from Third World natural resources and
very low-paid labour into metropolitan-based corporations.8
In the metropolitan countries, the banking system served to
channel most surpluses into productive investment within the
country. The Third World's surpluses, however, ended up not in
the colony, but in the metropole. These patterns of resource
allocation resulted from institutions, underpinned by the colonial
legal order.' Unless the law changes, however, institutions tend
to change, but usually slowly, and without conscious planning.1°
Unless the independent governments changed the received legal
order, the inherited economic institutions reproduced themselves,
and therefore also the impoverishment and vulnerability of the
masses and the wealth and privilege of their masters.
At Independence, every Third World country initially
continued in force the colonial legal order. To implement its
developmental goals, except for improving social welfare programs
8. See, e.g., F.H. CARDOZO, DEPENDENCY AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
(1979); A GUNDER FRANK, DEPENDENT ACCUMULATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1979);
R. PALMER AND N. PARSONS (eds.), The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and South Africa
(1971); A. Seidman and N.S. Makgetla, Outposts of Monopoly Capitalism: Southern Africa
in the Changing Global Economy (1980); I. WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD SYSTEM
(1974). The transnational corporations earned those enormous surpluses in part because the
colonial governments maintained legal orders that drove indigenous male workers out of their
villages into European employment at wages far lower than those they had to pay in the
metropole. Employers as a class must pay enough so that the working class can reproduce
itself. In the metropolitan countries, the male worker typically supported himself, a wife, a
couple of children, perhaps one or two old folk. In the colonies, because wives could support
children and old folk by subsistence farming, employers had to pay only enough to support the
male worker.
9. For example, the laws of every Anglophonic African colonial state prescribed
customary law for Africans, and English law for non-Africans. In effect, it prescribed
customary law for the hinterland (where most Africans lived and worked), and a form of law
conducive to capitalist exploitation for the export enclave. See, e.g. Ghana: The Supreme
Court Ordinance, 1874 (the prototype for the African reception statutes); Seidman, supra n.
3, at 29 ff.
10. I have elsewhere called this the Law of Reproduction of Institutions. Seidman, supra
note 2.
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in various ways," almost no Third World country made a
determined and vigorous assault on colonial law.
B. Enacting Inappropriate Laws
Almost invariably, the early Third World political rhetoric
called for radical change, usually using a socialist vocabulary. The
laws enacted, mainly facilitated not the transition to socialism, but
the continuation and growth of state capitalism. 2
C. Development-Oriented Laws That Did Not Work
Some countries did enact genuinely development-oriented
laws. Too many did not induce the prescribed behavior. They
did not either because they did not take into account accurately
the milieu within which the actors chose to obey or disobey the
new law, or because the laws assumed that the implementing
agencies specified in the law would behave in ways they did not. 3
A lawmaker's task consists in enacting not merely laws with high-
flown objectives, but laws that work - that is, laws that in practice
induce behaviors that tend to solve the social problems that excited
the laws. That so many Third World laws never induced the
11. To meet their constituencies' expectations, most Third World countries initially
enacted laws that instituted various sorts of social welfare programs. To pay off the loans
incurred to finance these, they increased exports without structural changes. When the world
market for their exports slumped, they could not pay back the loans. Forced by IMF
Structural Adjustment Programmes, in the 1980s they enacted new laws that cut back many
of the new social services.
12. See N.S. Makgetla and R.B. Seidman, "Legal Drafting and the Defeat of
Development Policy: The Experience of Anglophonic Southern Africa" 51. Law and Re. 421
(1987).
13. On the general issues of implementation, see, e.g., for the US, J. PRESSMAN AND A.
WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: How GREAT EXPECTATIONS IN WASHINGTON ARE DASHED
IN OAKLAND (1973); E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME (1977); for the Third World
generally, M.S. Grindle, "Policy Content and Context in Implementation," in M. GRINDLE,
ED., PoLiTics AND POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN THE THIRD WORLD (1980); for China, D.
LAMPTON (ED.), POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN POST-MAO CHINA (1987).
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behaviors prescribed, or induced inappropriate behaviors, exhibited
a failure of lawmaking.
III. Why Did the Law-Making System Fail to
Implement Development Goals? The Lawmakers
This section first identifies the key actors in the law-making
system 4 upon whose behaviors analysis must focus, and, second,
attempts to explain their behaviors.
A. The Key Actors in the Law-Making System
Laws emerge at the end of a long process, with many
participants, in which the legislative vote frequently does no more
than stamp a symbolic approval on decisions made much earlier.
In the former British colonies, for example, to create a specific
statute, significant actors included:
- the civil servants who usually first suggested the need for the
legislation;
* the Permanent Secretary and Minister who decided to study
the identified difficulty;
* the civil servants who studied the problem, generated a
legislative program, contacted "interested parties" for comments,
and produced a memorandum (sometimes called a "layman's
draft");
* the Cabinet Committee on Legislation that approved the
proposal and instructed Parliamentary Counsel to draft the bill,
and later would approve its final draft for Cabinet vote;
• the lawyers in the Office of Parliamentary Counsel;
14. Our myths tell us that courts implement the law, but clearly appellate courts make
law, at least in the interstices. Bureaucrats, too, supposedly implement law, but they also
constitute the most fecund source of ideas about what the law should be. The "law-making"
system includes all institutions that in fact make law. Which institutions make law constitutes
an empirical question. On the use of law to induce appropriate action by the law-
implementing system, see Seidman, "Drafting for the Rule of Law: The Problem of legality
in the Third Word," 12 YALE J. INT'L L. 84 (1987).
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- those whom they consulted - civil servants, mainly in the
Ministry concerned, but frequently in related Ministries, and
sometimes "interested parties" in civil society;
* the Cabinet that approved the bill for introduction into
Parliament, and;
- at the end of that long passage, the legislators who formally
enacted the bill into law. 5 All these functionaries acted in the
face of formal and informal rules purporting to prescribe their
behavior. In the face of those rules, what explains their failures to
introduce developmentally-oriented legislation?
B. The Law-Makers' Behavior
Generally to explain behavior in the face of law, important
categories for examination include: the applicable law, the role
occupant's opportunity and capacity to obey, whether she knows
the rules, her interest in obeying (or disobeying), the process by
which she comes to decide whether or not to obey, and her stated
or unstated ideology. 6 This subsection attempts generally to
explain the behavior of law-makers in terms of these categories.
(1) The Rules
No formal rules required law-makers to do anything about poverty
and powerlessness. Most Third World constitutions merely lodged
the legislative power with the legislature (and sometimes the
15. Perhaps one ought also to include the civil servants, lawyers and others who drafted
and enacted subordinate legislation, and the bureaucrats and judges who put a gloss on the
enacted legislation by their interpretations of it.
16. See Seidman, supra note 3, at Chapter 6. ROCCIPI forms a convenient mnemonic
for this list. Since no formal rules directed lawmakers to pay attention to development, the
questions of communication of the rule and the process by which the lawmakers decided to
obey become irrelevant here, and do not warrant discussion. For an example of its use to
analyze legislation, see GJ.Lyons, "Taking Money-Launderers to the Cleaners: A Problem
Solving Analysis of Current Legislation," ANNUAL REVIEW OF BANKING LAW/1990 635.
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executive). Many did not even contain aspirational clauses giving
a "right" to a job, education or health care.
(2) Opportunity and Capacity
Opportunity to contribute to law-making fell differentially
among the various actors, but all had some chance to do so. In
doing so, and in the sorts of laws they addressed, all of them had
great discretion to further development or not. For example, our
common myths tell us that drafters merely write into legalese
policies laid down by their political masters. worked out in detail
by senior civil servants. At least in most of Anglophonic Africa,
in practice, as often as not those superiors merely passed the
problem to the drafters, and asked them to come up with a
legislative solution. How to analyze the difficulty, where to get
ideas for a solution, how to weigh competing values - all these lay
in the drafter's discretion.
In most of the Third World, however, law-making lay in
amateur hands. Only a rare participant had much capacity to
produce development-relevant laws. Very few Third World
lawmakers had relevant economic training. Most political leaders
had none at all - and Professor Galbraith has warned us that
those who do not study economics fall sway to the dogmas of long-
dead economists. Because of their long experience, their supposed
technical expertise, and their daily experience with the deficiencies
in existing laws, not politicians but civil servants supply most ideas
for new laws. For the first few years after Independence,most
senior civil servants remained colonial relics. The new ones had
typically done their graduate work at Western universities, where
they had studied those long-dead economists. Those economists
did not address the problems of transforming the institutions of
developing countries. The legislative drafters made up a particular
category of scholars. They usually had no social science or
economics training. They repeatedly drafted statutes that solved
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problems in terms agreeable to those same long-dead economic
theorists, doing little to help development. 7
Like all bureaucracies, the structure of the civil service in part
defines the policy outcomes it produces.1 The structure of the
civil service did not advance development. Largely unchanged
since colonial times, Ministerial portfolios addressed the sorts of
problems the colonialists had identified - too frequently only law-
and-order and tax collection. 9
Interest. In most countries, whatever contradictions existed at
Independence between political leadership and the economic
ruling class rapidly disappeared. In country after country, not so
long after Independence the leadership seemed sunk in self-
aggrandizement. Rapidly, they joined the ranks of the exploiting
classes. They considered the claims and demands of the poor at
best when discontent threatened the stability of their regimes.
The same progression affected many civil servants. Returning
home bright-eyed with idealism after Independence, a few years
later many seemed to spend most of their office time conducting
not public but private business.
Ideology. As well as their interest, their ideologies tended to
influence officials to exercise their discretion in favor of those with
power and privilege. Their Western university training taught
most senior civil servants that the lack of capital caused Third
World poverty, and that only foreign private investment could cure
it." That explanation and solution discouraged legislation which
would radically change the received institutional structures.
Even the politicians who had fought for freedom in time
frequently changed their ideologies to ones that denied the need
17. Makgetla and Seidman, supra note 13, at 421-26.
18. Seidman, supra note 3, at Ch. 11; see also ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION (1971).
19. See, e.g., AL. ADU, THE CIVIL SERVICE IN NEW AFRICAN STATES 14-15 (1965); L
LaPolombara, Alternative Strategies for Developing Administrative Capabilities in Emerging
Nations, in F. RIGGS (ED.), FRONTIERS OF DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION (1971) 187;
Ilchman and Bhargava, Balanced Thought and Economic Growth, in id. at 264; Diamant,
Bureaucracy in Developmental Movement Regimes, in id. at 508, 525, 535; Burke and French,
Bureaucracy and Africanization, in id. at 545-56, 553-54.
20. See generally R.B.Seidman, "Codes to Regulate the Relationship between Foreign
Private Investors and their Host Country," 19 J. World Trade Law 637 (1985).
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for institutional transformation. By 1990, for most of the
Zimbabwean political leadership (who at Independence were
leaders of a self-proclaimed Marxist movement), socialism had
become a dirty word - and not because it had been tried and
failed. Government had never come close to instituting a
transition towards socialism."'
No rules demanded that lawmakers attend to development.
Most lacked the capacity to do so, and their interests and
ideologies quickly came to conform to those of the status quo.
The law-making system supported that outcome.
IV. The Law-Making System
As we have seen, laws emerge not from a single individual or
organization,22 but from a system with many players. The
simplest model of such a system consists of an input-output
process model. 23
21. For example, the Independence ar had as a root cause the issue of land. At
Independence, some 6000 white farmers owned about half Zimbabwe's land - much the most
arable half. 600,000 black peasant families barely survived on the other half.
"Notwithstanding its earlier rhetoric, in the first decade of independence," the government
managed to resettle about 40,000 families. Emphasis on agricultural reform shifted back to
the policies of the colonial regime, that is, to help peasants improve production without
changing their land or land tenures.
22. Graham Allison denotes the simplistic view of government decision-making the
Rational Actor model. He proposes two others: the Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational
Process models. Of the three, the Rational Actor model seems mythical; the other two begin
to model the real world. Allison, supra note 19, at 4-6, 10.
23. This model comes close the Allison's Organizational Process model. Id., 67 et seq.
His Bureaucratic Politics model, id. at 144 et seq. in which outcomes result from bureaucratic
bargaining and infighting, really counts only as a subset of organizational process. The relative
strength of bureaucracies in the bargaining process lies embedded in the interstices of the
institutions and processes of the decision-making system. Both models seem deficient in that
they make little effort to explain the relationships between the decision-making structure and
its social context.
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Input processes conversion processes outputs (decisions)
Feedback processes
Fig. 1.
The system's rules and processes determine: what and whose
issues the system will consider, what and whose inputs and
feedbacks to consider, whom the system will recruit for decision-
making posts, and with what socialization, and what sorts of
conversion processes, the package will be tied up and a decision
made. The range of system outputs - the decisions - results
from these inputs and conversion processes. The input, feedback
and conversion processes therefore determine in general to whose
interests and ideologies the laws will respond.
The. failure of Third World law-making systems to respond to
the claims and demands of the poor and powerless, therefore,
reflected. the way that the system filtered out their claims and
demands. The question becomes transformed from one asking
why the legal system produced (or failed to produce) laws with a
particular subject-matter, to why it produced laws that advanced
the interests not of the poor, but of the rich.
That reason lies in the system's overall structure.u Most bills
originated in the Civil Service, with the limitations we have noted.
Formally or informally, the powerful and privileged had easy
access to input and feedback channels, and sometimes even into
the heart of the conversion process, the Cabinet;' the poor did
not. The elite met in country club bars and at each other's homes,
to discuss matters of mutual interest; the poor never entered those
doors. When a civil servant consulted "interested parties" with
respect to a proposed bill, he always consulted organizations of
employers, but frequently omitted organizations of the poor even
24. See generaly, R.B. Seidman, "On Restructuring the Colonial State: How a Bill
became a Law in Zimbabwe," [1982] AFRICA 116.
25. For example, in considering increases in controlled prices, the relevant Minister in
Zimbabwe carried into Cabinet memoranda from the firms affected concerning their costs.
No other data appeared before Cabinet, nor did Cabinet frequently even consider the impact
of the increased prices on the poor or the economy generally.
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when they existed - usually they did not exist. Formal input
channels for the public at large hardly existed. The mass had
almost no way as of right to influence decision-makers. Basic
human rights such as freedom of expression, freedom to petition
legislators, and freedom to demonstrate rarely existed in practice.
Government secrecy prevented the mass even from knowing what
issues fell for consideration in governmental circles.
Even where elections existed, aside from limited capacity to
form viable parties representing the poor, for two principal reasons
elections did not provide democratic accountability. First, only a
very few governmental law-making decisions came under the Party
manifestoes, and in any event mainly took place behind closed
Ministerial doors.' At any rate, elections supposedly effectuate
popular will mainly through the legislature. In the Third World,
all bills came to parliament with Cabinet's imprimatur. Once
introduced, the backbenchers had a choice: To vote for the Bill
and hope for political advancement, or to vote against it, and cut
their own political throats. They rarely revolted. As an input
and feedback channel for the mass Parliament failed its function.
The law-making system, therefore, maximized inputs from
those on top of the heap, not the poor and powerless whom
development aims to help. Outputs responded to those influences.
These patterns of behaviors by law-makers and law-making systems
all bore a systematic relationship to the legal order. In principle,
by changing the law the political leadership could have changed
those institutions. They did not because they too quickly became
a bureaucratic bourgeoisie.
26. J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITAuSM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 269-83 (3rd. ed., 1950).
27. So far as I know, only once in all Africa's independent history: In Tanzania in the
1970s, when the Government wanted to increase ministerial salaries at a time of great austerity
in government generally.
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V. The Development of the Bureaucratic Bourgeoisie
In the Third World, the political elite demonstrated a marked
capacity to enter office as poor populists who quickly become rich
elitists - the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. In no place do rich elitists
have much will to solve mass poverty and powerlessness. The
critical issue became the growth of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie.
Why did it develop so rapidly and so pervasively? The broadest
answer lay in the leaders' new positions after Independence. From
poor leaders of freedom movements, they suddenly became
Ministers, living in grand houses, with bodyguards and servants,
being driven in Mercedes Benz automobiles.2 They quickly
acquired all the characteristics of a ruling class.29
Why did this new class arise? It found its source in the legal
order itself. No rule ordinarily forbade officials from acquiring
wealth. They had ample opportunity to acquire wealth. The rules
of a market economy hold out lures for everyone advantageously
placed to take advantage of them. Officials, to a degree exceeding
those of most others, had that advantageous position. They had
the capacity to get rich. In most countries, immediately after
Independence the people with the most formal education went
into government. They used their discretion in large part
(sometimes exclusively) to maximize rewards and lessen strains for
themselves and their organizations. By and large, in most Third
World countries the strata best positioned to increase the rewards
28. In Tanzania, the Swahili name for the political elite became the WaBenzi - the
people of the Benz.
29. I denote them as a ruling class because of these characteristics: (1) They held
positions of power both in the political and the economic realms; (2) they could and did use
that power to enrich themselves; (3) they had close personal relationships with each other and
with the members of the economic ruling class; (4) they could and did pass on their wealth
intergenerationally.
30. The General orders of the Civil Service, inherited from the Colonial regime, usually
contained provisions that made it difficult for officials to enter trade or business. After
Independence, in some countries the civil servants managed to get these removed, see, e.g.
Republic of Kenya, Report of the Commission of Enquiry - Public Service Structure and
Remuneration Commission (Ngwadega Commission Report) (1971); in others, they fell into
desuetude.
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and lessen the strains upon officials - that is, to appeal to their
interests - consist of those with power and influence, both in the
political and the civil society. They had many goodies to dangle
before official eyes. Most of these enticements are legal - from
politicians, bigger budgets and career advancement; from
businessmen, a seat on a Board of Directors, a post for one's wife,
a bank loan at advantageous rates - some are illegal (bribery).
Some posts carried with them enormous economic power,
especially those in government corporations. There, the managers
and directors had all, the de facto power that usually attaches to
similar posts in private corporations.3' Just as the management
of private-sector corporations constitutes an important element of
the economic ruling class in capitalist societies, so in the Third
World did the management of public corporations.
Only their ideologies might have broken the headlong rush
into a new ruling class. Ideas flow from behavior as much as the
contrary. In time, not populism but the class interests of the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie became the engine that drove ideology.
The usual explanation holds that the ruling class first existed, and
then used law and state power to consolidate its power. In the
Third World, the political elite used the law to become a ruling
class. In a sense, law created the ruling class.
How did that happen? Class lpower rests on economic and
political institutions - property, corporations, banks, land tenures,
elections, and law-making and law-implementing institutions
generally. A systematic relationship exists between institutions and
the law. Class power, institutions and the legal order: These
constitute a trinity, so that changing any of them changes the
others. Not only can we explain the existence of law by class
power, but also vice versa.
The systematic behavior of law-makers and law-making
systems explains why the legal orders of the Third World so badly
attended to the issues of development. The growth of the
31. See A.A. BERLE AND G.C MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932); J.K GALBRArrHK THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
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bureaucratic bourgeoisie explains why the leadership did not
change the institutions which produced that result.
VI. The Institutions of Participation
All these explanations for the behavior of individual
lawmakers, for the behavior of the law-making system, and for the
growth of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie suggest legislative solutions,
on levels from the mundane to the sublime: For poorly trained
drafters, further education in the behavioral consequences of law
and political economy; for too much secrecy, laws requiring
openness; 2 for the mistakes about the addressee's milieu, that so
frequently leads to incompetently-drawn legislative programs, more
inputs from the addressees; for the failure of free expression, more
human rights; for corruption, police units aimed at corruption3
and better accounting systems;34 for better control over misuse of
discretion, the narrowest grants of discretion the nature of the case
will admit, an Ombudsman, and easy access to courts and legal
aid. 5
All these - as indeed does Development itself - presupposes
a government that has a will towards development. Once the
bureaucratic bourgeoisie has established itself, that will cannot
exist. Only for a brief period after Independence, at the start of
the fatal race, does a window of opportunity exist to change the
institutions that permit the development of a bureaucratic
bourgeoisie and exclude mass participation. A truly revolutionary
leadership must act decisively after taking office, or the existing
institutions will likely win the fatal race.
32. Cf. Swedish Constitution, Ch. 2, Art 1(1) and (2) Freedom of the Press Act, Ch. 2,
Arts. 12, 13; The Secrecy Act, 1980, passim; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1989).
33. Hong Kong has a famous example that Zambia among others has copied.
34. R.B. Seidman, "Why do People Obey the Law? The Case of Corruption in
Developing Countries," 5 BRIT J.L Soc. 45 (1978).
35. See J. HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DISCRETION (1986); W. GELLHORN,
OMBUDSMEN AND OTHERS (1966); D. ROWAT (ed.), THE OMBUDSMAN PLAN (1973).
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Some laws to make less likely the development of a
bureaucratic bourgeoisie suggest themselves, most importantly,
care in drafting the laws on which class power rests (e.g., banking
law, public and private corporation law, property law, election law)
as well as direct prohibitions (a Leadership Code, prohibitions on
bank financing of leadership acquisitions of productive property).
More important, however, are devices to ensure accountability to
the mass, and to ensure actual mass participation in the law-
making processes.
Accountability for political behavior begins but does not end
with competitive elections for office - even in One-Party states.36
Other devices deserve exploration, 37 for example, recall elections,
institutions permitting constituencies to bind their representatives
with respect to particular issues, and requirements that electoral
representatives maintain offices in their constituencies,' that
representatives report back to their constituencies regularly at
open, public meetings, and that bureaucrats and officials make
their decisions in public and state in writing the reasons for at least
their most important decisions, constitutional protection of the
right of complaint and written response.39
Finding devices to permit the mass to participate directly in
the processes of governance raises much more difficult issues.
They can best participate in small, face-to-face groups. That
implies that as much of government as possible ought to devolve
upon local government and workplace institutions. How to
structure small organizations to ensure that their members in fact
36. Cf. Tanzania's example of competitive one-party elections. L CLnFFE (ED.), ONE
PARTY DEMOCRACY (1967).
37. A draft constitution originally proposed by SWAPO for Namibia contained a number
of these (only some survived into the final draft). See R.B. Seidman, "A Commentary on the
Proposed Draft Constitution of the Republic of Namibia," 1988 THIRD WORLD LEOAL
STUDIEs 35.
38. See Zambia's proposals for One Party Democracy.
39. See U.S.S.R., CONsT., Ch. VII, Arts. 49,58; People's Republic of China, CONSr., Art.
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make decisions as a central device for directly empowering the
powerless has received extensive study.'
On the national level, referenda on particular issues may prove
useful, although some debate that.41 It would seem, however,
that access to input and feedback systems constitutes the principal
feasible device for mass participation. Obviously, that requires
openness in government, and structured points of access by the
mass: public hearings before Ministers to decide on subordinate
legislation, held at places at which poor people can attend;
changing the system of law-making so that bills will receive wide
public circulation and perhaps even Parliamentary discussion before
cast in concrete by Cabinet approval; canvassing of organizations
of the masses as "interested parties" with respect to all proposed
legislation and subordinate legislation; development of
participatory systems of economic planning;42 systematically
sending national leaders into the countryside to hear local
complaints - and ensuring that when they go, they listen to more
than the local elite;43 and, again, systematic respect for human
rights, so that people can petition for redress, express new points
of view, voice complaints, and even take to the streets as a way of
bringing home to decision-makers the point of view not of the
classes but the masses.
In the end, successful participation depends upon the
education and the organization of the masses. So long as
participation means only the mobilization of bias, an impossible
contradiction quickly emerges between the parochial biases and
40. See KAYLALA, MHLANGA, A. SEIDMAN AND SEMBOJA, AID AND DEVELOPMENT:
EVALUATING A PARTICIPATORY LEARNING PROCESS (1988).
41. Switzerland, with a highly educated and literate population, has found that referenda
have served a useful purpose. For a discussion of the debate and a strong argument in favor
of referenda, see C. Gillette, "Plebiscites, Participation and Collective Government in Local
Government Law," 86 MICH. L.R. 930 (1989).
42. See S.C. PATNAIK, ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PLANNING IN
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES 163-71 (1982).
43. So did Zimbabwe's government in the very early months after Independence. See
Seidman, supra note 25.
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national needs." The solution lies in understanding normative
choices in development as something more than the choice of
"values," like choosing chocolate or vanilla ice cream. 5 That
calls for a high degree of understanding of the appropriate uses of
scientific modes of thought in policy analysis and development.
Given that mode of thought, ensuring that the clients of projects
themselves evaluate them constitutes the critical step in
empowerment.4
That scientific mode of thought does not arise, like Athena
from the brain of Zeus, fully mature and armed for battle, all at
once. It emerges only after long experience with the help of
facilitators who themselves understand the appropriate
methodologies. People learn by doing. Paradoxically, the
necessary education cannot begin until ordinary people
systematically assess how things are going and why - that is, until
they have the power to evaluate and control their own social lives.
Given that control, at the present low level of social scientific
education, of course the outcomes will be messy and frequently
seem counterproductive.
Messiness seems a small price to pay for beginning the road
to conquering poverty and powerlessness.
Second, participation on many levels seems impossible for
unorganized people. Street demonstrations do not happen without
44. In Yugoslavia, a great deal of local autonomy and democratic participation led to a
denigration of national interests in favor of local ones - a sort of pervasive game of Prisoner's
Dilemma or the Tragedy of the Commons. The Prisoner's Dilemma is this: In a prison
uprising that will surely go forward without any particular prisoner's commitment, it is in each
individual prisoner's interest to play both sides: To seem to go along with the rebels, but
secretly to inform the wardens, thus protecting one's personal interest in the event of either
becoming the victor, without significantly weakening the rebellion. Given that potential, how
can any rebellion succeed? The Tragedy of the Commons is this: If everyone may graze as
many cattle on the Commons as he or she wishes, each will try to increase his or her herd to
seize for their owner the maximum possible amount of the commonly-held property. That
quickly leads to the degradation of the biomass and erosion - which lies in nobody's interest.
In both cases, the vigorous pursuit of every actor's individual interest does not lead the
beneficent Invisible Hand, but disaster.
45. Compare J. DEWEY, THEORY OF VALUATION (1939) with R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (3rd. ed., 1989).
46. Kaylala et al., supra note 41.
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organization. Newspapers putting forth the position of the masses
do not just suddenly appear; they require organization and capital.
At public hearings, without experts representing mass interests, the
articulation of the position of the poor likely will prove ineffective.
If a Minister wants to consult peasants about a proposal, he has
difficulty in doing so unless some peasant's organization exists.
How can the law foster the growth of organizations whose
main function will become (in effect) to harass government itself?.
That does not pose an insolvable contradiction, although it will
remain a constant struggle.47  Without the systematic
development of non-governmental organization representing
people, however, people power - the only appropriate power for
a theory of development that perceives people-empowerment as its
main object - can hardly succeed.
VII. Conclusion
The fatal race that began at Independence depended for its
outcome on the leadership's ability quickly to create law that would
transform the law-making process itself, and make less likely the
development of a bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Law imbricates
development because poverty and powerlessness constitute social
problems, and therefore issues of social behavior. Law constitutes
government's principal device to affect behavior and therefore
institutions. To explain the failure of most legal orders to
implement development goals, we must examine lawmakers and
law-making systems. There, the central difficulty lies in the
simultaneous transformation of the political elite into a
bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and the systematic exclusion of the
masses from decision-making. The solution lies, therefore, in
impeding the development of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, and
stimulating the development of institutions of mass participation.
47. Cf. the development of poverty law in US, where US has funded lawsuits against
government itself- but not without real opposition. Also see Handler, supra note 38, at 6-15.
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When and how can this be done? The analysis advanced here
suggests that at least in the first few moments after a successful
populist revolution, the political elite have not yet become a
bureaucratic bourgeoisie; their ideologies remain for the moment
allied with the poor and disinherited. If they have studied the
history of the failure of Third World governments to induce
development, at that moment perhaps they have the will and could
have the knowledge to avoid repeating it. They have to transform
the received state into one conducive to development.
This analysis, of course, provides no answers to any specific
country's particular problems. It may at best provide the start of
a research agenda to explain the failure of most countries to
implement development goals, and thus to begin the task of
looking for solutions. No inevitability dictates that the powerful
and the privileged need win the fatal race.
